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Both guilt and regret typically result from counterfactual evaluations of personal choices
that caused a negative outcome and are thought to regulate human decisions by peo-
ple’s motivation to avoid these emotions. Despite these similarities, studies asking people
to describe typical situations of guilt and regret identified the social dimension as a fun-
damental distinguishing factor, showing that guilt but not regret specifically occurs for
choices in interpersonal (social) contexts. However, an experimental paradigm to investi-
gate this distinction systematically by inducing emotions of guilt and regret online is still
missing. Here, extending existing procedures, we introduce such a paradigm, in which
participants choose in each trial between two lotteries, with the outcome of the chosen
lottery (gain or loss) being either assigned to themselves (intrapersonal trials) or to another
person (interpersonal trials). After results of both the chosen and the unchosen lottery were
shown, subjects rated how they felt about the outcome, including ratings of guilt and regret.
Trait Guilt (TG) was determined for all participants in order to take their general inclination
to experience guilt into account. Results confirmed that guilt but not regret specifically
occurred in an interpersonal context. Percentages of loss averse choices (choosing the
lottery with the lower possible monetary loss) were determined as indicators of regulation
via guilt and regret avoidance. High TG scorers generally made more loss averse choices
than low TG scorers, while trial-by-trial analyses showed that low TG scorers used their
feelings of guilt more specifically to avoid the same emotional experience in subsequent
choices. Our results confirm the social dimension as the critical factor distinguishing guilt
from regret and identify TG as an important moderator determining the way in which guilt
vs. regret can regulate their own occurrence by influencing choice strategies.
Keywords: guilt, regret, social decision-making, game theory, loss aversion, emotion regulation
INTRODUCTION
Guilt and regret are two closely related emotions. In everyday
life, they tend to co-occur, which may be the reason why many
people would find it difficult to distinguish between them con-
ceptually. In their analysis of regret, Gilovic and Medvec (1995)
expressed this relatedness by proposing that feelings of regret are
“likely to be tinged with guilt.” In fact, guilt and regret share
essential features. One commonality is that both emotions typ-
ically occur in situations when one feels responsible for a negative
outcome or harm, which could have been avoided if one had cho-
sen a different action. Thus, both guilt and regret are based on
counterfactual choice evaluation, i.e., a comparison of an actual
outcome of a choice with what could have happened in case of
an alternative choice. Not surprisingly, both emotions accordingly
also share essential phenomenological characteristics. For exam-
ple, in a study by Russell and Mehrabian (1977) participants were
asked to rate various emotions on a semantic differential (includ-
ing pleasure–displeasure, arousal–non-arousal, and dominance–
submissiveness). No difference between guilt and regret was found
for any of the emotion features. Both guilt and regret, in contrast to
most other emotions, are also closely related to agency and person-
ally experienced responsibility. For example, Frijda et al. (1989),
comparing appraisal components of 32 emotions, found that guilt
and regret differed from all other emotions (including shame) by a
particularly strongly associated experience of self-agency. Notably,
guilt and regret also share an important functional feature: expe-
riencing them is thought to regulate subsequent behavior by a
motivation to avoid the occurrence of these feelings after future
choices (Zeelenberg et al., 1996; Coricelli et al., 2005; Ellingsen
et al., 2010; Chang et al., 2011). Of course, people are generally
motivated to avoid negative emotional states, but because guilt
and regret are so closely linked to personal choice behavior and
therefore also to personal responsibility and control (which is
much less the case for other typical negative emotions like anger
or fear), people can actively and deliberately adopt appropriate
choice strategies to regulate (i.e., reduce) the probability of expe-
riencing them in the future. From this perspective, both guilt and
regret can be regarded as “self-regulating emotions.”
Nevertheless, despite all these similarities, two studies perform-
ing a closer analysis of the psychological determinants of guilt and
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regret revealed one critical dimension that clearly distinguishes
between guilt and regret, namely the social dimension (Berndsen
et al., 2004; Zeelenberg and Breugelmans, 2008). In this context,
social dimension refers to the target of the negative outcome or
harm that one caused, i.e., whether the negative outcome affected
oneself (intrapersonal or non-social condition) or another person
(interpersonal or social condition). Both of the studies showed
that when this factor is taken into account, guilt can be clearly
distinguished from regret in being strongly associated with inter-
personal but not intrapersonal harm, while no such specificity
is found for regret. In one of the experiments, Zeelenberg and
Breugelmans, 2008, Study 1) presented their subjects with two ver-
sions of a hypothetical scenario, asking them how they would feel
in the respective situation. Specifically, participants were asked to
imagine that they had left their clothes and shoes in the bathroom
after taking a shower, and that later they themselves (intrapersonal
condition) or their mother (interpersonal condition) would stum-
ble over them, leading to a broken foot and unbearable pain. There
was a highly significant interaction between the person suffering
from harm (self vs. mother) and the emotion (guilt vs. regret). In
particular, subjects rated substantially higher guilt but not regret
for the interpersonal as compared to the intrapersonal condition.
Similar patterns were found for emotion ratings of actual events
that subjects recalled from their own past. Some data in the studies
by Berndsen et al. (2004) pointed to an opposite pattern for regret
than for guilt, i.e., stronger ratings after intrapersonal than after
interpersonal harm, but this could not be confirmed by Zeelenberg
and Breugelmans’ (2008) data. Together, these results are in line
with Baumeister et al.’s (1994) analysis of guilt as an inherently
interpersonal emotion, which occurs in social relationships and
helps to maintain them, although the specific difference between
guilt and regret was not directly addressed in this analysis.
Based on the distinction between intra- and interindividual
harm, the primary aim of the present study was to develop an
experimental paradigm that allowed us to differentially induce
guilt and regret online in a systematic manner as a result of sub-
jects’ actual choices during the experiment. Generally, it is quite
a challenge to induce these emotions in standardized laboratory
settings, especially for guilt, because this requires subjects to act in
a way that makes them feel responsible for a damage to another
person, which they would naturally avoid (particularly with the
knowledge that one’s behavior is continuously registered by an
experimenter). To circumvent these problems, several procedures
have been developed to induce feelings of guilt without directly
linking them to choices made online within an experimental para-
digm. Such procedures encompass the imagination of hypothetical
scenarios (Takahashi et al., 2004; Moll et al., 2007; Kedia et al.,
2008), giving false feedback (Amodio et al., 2007), reading newspa-
per articles (Stillman and Baumeister, 2010), or autobiographical
memory paradigms, in which subjects write down specific emo-
tional events from their own past (De Hooge et al., 2007; Gangemi
et al., 2007; Nelissen et al., 2007) or are directly asked to specif-
ically relive the emotions from such personal past events (Shin
et al., 2000; Wagner et al., 2011). Especially the latter method is
well suited to induce relatively intense feelings of guilt in the lab-
oratory, because the strongest guilt-inducing stimuli are selected
individually and refer to events that actually happened rather than
merely being hypothetical situations (Wagner et al., 2011). In the
present study, however, we were specifically interested in the occur-
rence of guilt and regret in the context of actual choices within the
experimental setting. In this way, we would induce these emotions
in a manner more fitting to simulate their natural occurrence,
which is typically linked to individual choices. Furthermore we
would also be able to analyze the consequences of experiencing
guilt and regret on the regulation of subsequent choice behavior
in repeated conditions.
For this purpose, we used a decision-making paradigm in which
subjects repeatedly make choices with real monetary effects. Such
paradigms were originally developed within the framework of
game theory (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944) and are
meanwhile frequently used in the fields of social neuroscience,
neuroeconomics, and decision-making research to model the
dynamics of choice behavior as well as to analyze the underlying
neural mechanisms (Fehr and Camerer, 2007; Sanfey, 2007). In
recent economic research, emotional factors like guilt and regret
are sometimes incorporated into such models as parameters in
mathematical formulas of utility functions developed to optimize
the prediction of choice behavior in certain game-theoretical par-
adigms (Coricelli et al., 2005; Krajbich et al., 2009; Chang et al.,
2011). However, even though these studies demonstrate that the
role of guilt and regret in economic choice behavior has basi-
cally been acknowledged, participants in this type of research are
typically not directly asked for their specific emotions after they
have made a choice and got feedback about the outcome. Here,
complementing these neuroeconomic approaches, we obtained
participants’ ratings regarding their feelings of guilt and regret,
which allowed us to directly test the assumed interpersonal speci-
ficity of subjective guilt experiences in actual decisions. Although
guilt and regret have already been addressed separately in a variety
of studies of choice behavior, there is currently no decision-making
paradigm that directly compares them as possible factors in their
effects on choice behavior.
To develop such a paradigm, we relied on a well-established
procedure from Coricelli and coworkers (Camille et al., 2004; Cori-
celli et al., 2005) that has been used to investigate (intrapersonal)
regret, extending it by an interpersonal (social) condition to induce
guilt. Within each trial of this paradigm, subjects choose which of
two lotteries is to be played. For each of the two lotteries, the
amount of money that can be won or lost is indicated on the
screen, as well as the respective probabilities of winning or losing.
After the decision, the selected lottery is played and the outcome
(won or lost amount of money) is added/subtracted from the
overall earnings of the subject. Apart from the outcome of the
actually played lottery, the outcome of the non-selected lottery is
also shown. This procedure, as applied in the original version of
the paradigm developed by Coricelli et al. (2005), is well suited
to induce regret, which is expected to occur when the outcome
of the non-selected lottery would have been better than that of
the selected lottery due to counterfactual evaluation. However, all
outcomes are only attributed to the participant himself/herself
in this original paradigm, so this would constitute only intra-
personal regret, as the possible negative outcome does not affect
anybody else. We therefore introduced an interpersonal (social)
condition, in which the decision was not made for oneself but for
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another person. In order to maximize the probability and extent
of feelings of guilt in this interpersonal condition, we designated
as the other person a young child, Anastasia, in need of expensive
medical treatment for which a local organization was collecting
donations (see Materials and Methods, for details). In each trial,
the outcome was either assigned to the subject (“self” condition)
or to Anastasia (“other” condition), so that gains and losses were
independently determined for the two conditions. The assignment
was always announced at the beginning of each trial, before the
subject made his or her choice. In control conditions (no respon-
sibility), the computer made a random choice, and the subject
just watched what happened on the screen. In the end of each
trial, subjects were asked to rate how they felt about the outcome
with respect to different emotions, including ratings of guilt and
regret.
In short, our paradigm basically used the well-known Coricelli
procedure, but extended it in two ways in order to allow a distinc-
tion between guilt and regret according to previous psychological
research (Berndsen et al., 2004; Zeelenberg and Breugelmans,
2008). First, an interpersonal (social) condition was introduced
in addition to the intrapersonal (non-social) condition. Second,
specific emotion ratings were obtained after each trial, allowing us
to directly test the psychological patterns of guilt vs. regret experi-
ences from the studies of hypothetical scenarios and descriptions
of personally recalled events within a behavioral decision-making
paradigm. According to the results from Berndsen et al. (2004) and
Zeelenberg and Breugelmans (2008), we hypothesized that guilt,
but not regret, would be substantially more pronounced in the
interpersonal than in the intrapersonal condition after negative
outcomes1. In order to take individual a priori differences in the
inclination to experience guilt into account, we also assessed Trait
Guilt (TG) in each subject (Kugler and Jones, 1992; Jones et al.,
2000). We expected stronger guilt feelings in individuals with high
TG scores than in individuals with low TG scores after own choices
with negative outcomes.
A second aim in this study was to analyze regulating effects
of guilt and regret on subsequent choice behavior. As mentioned,
both guilt and regret are thought to affect subsequent behavior
by a motivation to avoid their occurrence in future choices (Zee-
lenberg et al., 1996; Coricelli et al., 2005; Ellingsen et al., 2010;
Chang et al., 2011) and thus have the capacity to (down-)regulate
themselves on the long run. In the present paradigm, there were
only very limited options to act, and we held the expected values
of the two lotteries within a trial constant, so there were also not
many possible criteria on which subjects could decide in a way
that would avoid guilt or regret in subsequent choices. Still, par-
ticipants could decide on the basis of loss aversion (Kahneman and
1We did not formulate an opposite hypothesis for regret, i.e stronger regret experi-
ences in the intrapersonal than in the interpersonal context. Based on the previous
findings from Berndsen et al. (2004) and Zeelenberg and Breugelmans (2008), it
seems to depend on specific circumstances of a situation whether regret per se
would differ between intra- and interpersonal conditions. Accordingly, our focus is
more on guilt than on regret here, and on the difference between guilt and regret.
Therefore, whatever the effect on regret per se would be, we would in any case expect
an interaction in that the propensity to be experienced more strongly in interper-
sonal as compared to intrapersonal contexts would be clearly more pronounced for
guilt than for regret.
Tversky, 1984), i.e., choosing the lottery with the lower possible
amount of lost money in the case of a loss, which would be a simple
and effective strategy to reduce the expected extent of guilt/regret
if the chosen lottery does not win2. We expected that particularly
participants high in TG would be inclined to use such a strategy
because – due to their overall increased tendency to experience
guilt – they may be more motivated to avoid it. This expecta-
tion is based on previous findings that subjects with higher TG
activate brain areas that are specific to the experience of guilt (in
the orbitofrontal cortex) to a stronger degree than subjects with
lower TG scores (Wagner et al., 2011). Although mostly pertinent
to interpersonal choices, such a strategy would be expected to be
adopted in all choices by individuals high in TG, because they
tend to interpret their guilt feelings, more than individuals low in
TG, as a general hint at possible threats also to the self (Gangemi
et al., 2007). Nevertheless, apart from (and independent of) this
expected general effect of TG on loss averse choice tendencies, TG
could additionally moderate dynamic, condition-specific effects of
the expected (interpersonal) guilt vs. (intrapersonal) regret expe-
riences in trial-by-trial analyses. Here, however, subjects low in TG
may be more sensitive. Hence, when directly experiencing nega-
tive outcomes of own choices, subjects low in TG, as compared
with those high in TG, may be more inclined to use specifically
(interpersonal) guilt as a relevant information to be considered
in the next choice (in order to avoid repetition of this specific
experience). This assumption is based on previous findings that
subjects with low prosocial value orientation are most sensitive to
guilt-induced enhancement of cooperative behavior (Ketelaar and
Au, 2003; De Hooge et al., 2007; Nelissen et al., 2007). Accordingly,
applying this directly to the personal inclination to experience
guilt, more loss aversion would be expected in subjects scoring
low in TG specifically after a negatively evaluated outcome in the
interpersonal choice condition (assumed to elicit guilt) than in
the intrapersonal choice condition (not assumed to elicit guilt).
Furthermore, such an effect should be specifically exerted on
the subsequent interpersonal condition, where in contrast to the
intrapersonal condition guilt feelings would be imminent in the
case of a “bad” choice.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
SUBJECTS
We recruited 23 subjects (10 female) for the experiment, who were
paid for participation. All but one were right-handed and had
no history of neurological or psychological disorder. Participants’
ages ranged between 19 and 31 years (mean= 23.61 years) and
each gave informed written consent. The study was approved by
the local ethics committee at the Charité Berlin. One male partic-
ipant was excluded because he expressed a generally very negative
opinion on charity donations, counteracting the basic idea of our
study.
2An alternative possible strategy would be to compare both gambles in terms of risk
as defined by the difference between the possible gain and the possible loss within
each gamble. However, we expected that within the constraints of our paradigm,
which includes repeated testing with limited decision time, subjects would rather
rely on the less cognitively demanding strategy of loss avoidance, in which only two
numbers have to be compared.
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TASK AND EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE
Before participants were given the instructions to the actual task,
they were presented with information about a 4-year old Ukrainian
girl called Anastasia, the beneficiary of the earnings in the “other”
condition. This information included a short text describing the
current situation of the child (with a focus on the nature of her
illness and her urgent need of medical treatment) and the organi-
zation that collects money for this treatment (“Berlin hilft e.V.”).
Subjects were informed that they would subsequently participate
in a computer game where money could be won or lost not only
for themselves, but also for Anastasia, depending on their choices
in the game. It was made clear that there would be a real dona-
tion to the charitable organization collecting for Anastasia at the
end of the experiment, and as proof, they would ultimately sign the
money transfer form not only for themselves but also for Anastasia.
As a further proof that Anastasia and the charitable organization
“Berlin hilft e.V.” really exists, subjects were shown the internet
site of the organization, including photographs of Anastasia. Sub-
sequently, they indicated on rating scales in a short questionnaire
their opinion on the usefulness of the organization’s aim to collect
donations for Anastasia’s medical treatment, and their momentary
impulse to actually donate to Anastasia. These control questions
confirmed a generally positive attitude (means± SEM on rating
scales from 0 to 10: 8.41± 0.40 for usefulness, 6.41± 0.57 for
current impulse to donate).
Subjects then read the instruction for the experimental task. As
mentioned, the task was based on the well-established paradigm by
Coricelli and colleagues (Camille et al., 2004; Coricelli et al., 2005),
but we used a visually simplified version as described by Nicolle
et al. (2011). Participants were instructed to choose between two
“wheel of fortune” lottery gambles on each trial, each featuring
a win and a loss outcome with differing probabilities (25, 50, or
75%). The probabilities of their possible financial gain or loss were
represented by the relative size of colored sectors of a circle (green
for win probabilities and red for loss probabilities). Possible gains
and losses in a given trial were indicated by positive numbers on
the green part of the respective circle (for the possible gains) and
negative numbers on the red part of the respective circle (for the
possible losses). These numbers represented Euro cents that could
be won or lost in the respective lottery, which could be up to 500
cents per trial. In half of the trials this amount of money was
assigned to the subject (“self” condition= intrapersonal), in the
other half of the trials it was assigned to a donation to Anasta-
sia (“other” condition= interpersonal). Additionally, as a control
condition for choice responsibility (a critical prerequisite for feel-
ings of both guilt and regret), in both the “self” and the “other”
condition, subjects could not choose the lottery themselves, but
the computer made a random choice, which subjects could only
watch passively on the screen (“follow”condition). No or only very
low feelings of guilt and regret were expected to occur in these tri-
als due to a lack of felt responsibility. Thus, the design comprised
the two within subjects factors “self vs. other” and “choose vs. fol-
low,” with differences between “self” and “other” in the “choose”
condition being of primary interest. It should be noted, however,
that despite the passivity of the subject in the “follow” trials, these
trials were as relevant as the “choose” trials in terms of monetary
gain or loss, because their outcomes were still assigned either to the
subject or to Anastasia according to the “self”/“other” condition,
just as in the “choose” trials.
Altogether, the experiment comprised 128 trials, i.e., 32 per
experimental condition, presented in random order. The assign-
ment of specific lottery pairs to experimental conditions was
balanced across subjects. An initial capital of 5 Euro was assigned
separately to both the subject and to Anastasia, and subjects were
told that depending on their decisions, their own as well as Anasta-
sia’s initial capital could increase (to up to more than 50 Euro in the
best case) or be lost completely in the course of the experimental
game. The task was displayed by Eprime2 software on the screen of
a desktop computer located on a table in front of the participant.
Before the actual task began, subjects performed a short practice
run in order to get familiarized with the basic procedure.
Figure 1 shows an exemplary trial of the task from the start up
to the display of the gamble outcome. At the beginning of each
trial, subjects were presented with a slide informing them about
which of the four possible conditions would follow, i.e., showing
information about (i) who they were playing for (“self” or “other”
FIGURE 1 | Exemplary trial. One of two lotteries was to be chosen in
each trial. The outcome of the chosen lottery had actual monetary
consequences (gain or loss) for either the participant or Anastasia. In
the beginning of each trail, the experimental condition of the trial was
announced. There were four possibilities, depending on whether the
gain/loss of the chosen lottery would be assigned to the participant or
to Anastasia (“self” vs. “other” condition), and whether the participant
or the computer would decide which lottery would be played (“choose”
vs. “follow” condition). See text, for detailed description of the
procedure.
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condition) and (ii) whether it would be them or the computer
deciding between the two gambles (“choose” or “follow” condi-
tion). After subjects indicated by a button press that they had
understood this information, the trial itself started by showing the
two lotteries, one of which was to be selected.
In “choose” trials, the preferred gamble was selected by the
subject by means of pressing either “c” (gamble on the left-hand
side) or “v” (gamble on the right-hand side) on the computer’s
keyboard. Participants were allowed up to 8 s to make their choice
(which was abundant time; mean choice time was 3.49 s). A longer
hesitation resulted in a message on the screen reminding them to
act faster in the future (which occurred very rarely, on average
1.2 times per subject) before going straight on to the next trial.
To ensure that choice times in the “follow” conditions (computer
choices) did not differ from the “choose” conditions, the average
of the previous three “choose” trials was used as the choice times
in the “follow” conditions. Once selected (by either the subject or
the computer), the chosen gamble was highlighted on the screen
by a blue square, which remained there for 3–5 s (4 s on average).
After this delay phase, the outcomes of both gambles (the selected
one and the non-selected one) were shown, with the outcome of
the selected gamble again being highlighted by a blue square.
After the outcome phase participants were asked to indicate
how they felt about the outcome by several subjective ratings.
Ratings were provided in a two-stage procedure. First, subjects
gave an overall rating on how they felt on a 6-point scale ranging
from “very negative” to “very positive.” The scale was presented as
six horizontally arranged boxes on the screen, with the two ver-
bal labels as anchors shown on the left (“very negative”) and on
the right (“very positive”). Participants were able to move a cur-
sor (initially positioned in the middle) between the six boxes and
finally confirmed their choice by pressing the key “m.” Then, in the
second step, if the final position of the cursor had been in one of
the three boxes symbolizing predominantly negative feelings about
the outcome (the focus of interest here), the subject was asked to
rate the extent of several specific negative emotions felt, namely
guilt, regret3, anger/irritation, and disappointment. This was done
by means of moving the cursor on a straight line, with no such
feeling on the outmost left (verbally anchored as “not at all”) and a
very intense feeling being on the outmost right (verbally anchored
as “very strong”). All these questions started with the cursor on
the outer left (i.e., using no feeling of the respective emotion as
the default) rather than in the middle of the scale, to avoid a pos-
sible bias of central tendency. The final cursor position had to
be confirmed by pressing “m” before the next question appeared.
Eleven cursor positions were possible, which were recoded into
numbers from 0 to 10. Analogously, if the participant had initially
indicated to feel predominantly positively about the outcome (by
choosing one of the three rightmost boxes in the first question),
he/she was subsequently asked to rate the extent of several specific
3There are two possible German translations for “regret”, i.e. “bedauern” and
“bereuen”. In our experiment, we used the latter one, which more than the for-
mer one implies personal responsibility. We used the verb form “bereuen” because
the corresponding noun “Reue” has a religious connotation (similar to repentance)
and would normally not be used with respect to simple decisions made in everyday
life.
positive emotions felt, namely joy/happiness, relief, contentment,
and pride. In all trials (whether negative or positive), subjects were
further asked in the second rating step to indicate to which extent
they felt responsible for the outcome (as a control question for the
“choose” vs. “follow” manipulation). The five ratings contained
in the second rating step were presented in randomized order.
Because the negative emotions guilt and regret were in the focus
of interest here, analyses of the subjective ratings were limited to
the negatively evaluated outcomes.
The two gambles in each presented gamble pair were of equal
or nearly equal expected value (maximal difference of 3 cents). In
order not to draw attention to this fact, we used uneven values for
gains and losses in most of the gambles (avoiding numbers that
could be divided by 10), so that an exact calculation of expected
values was difficult even after some task practice. (This proce-
dure is the reason why expected values were not always exactly the
same between the two gambles, but could deviate by a few cents.)
Furthermore, following the procedure of Nicolle et al. (2011), to
additionally obscure the fact that expected values in each gam-
ble pair were essentially identical, as well as to enhance feelings
of skill in the game, two of the trials in each condition were
“catch trials.” This term refers to trials including one gamble with
a clearly higher expected value than the other. These “catch trials”
were not included in statistical analyses. One catch trial as well
as two of the remaining trials in each condition further served
as “attention control trials.” In these “attention control trials,” the
outcome phase was not followed by subjective emotion ratings
but by three questions to determine how well the participant had
paid attention to the experimental conditions of the current trial.
Specifically, subjects were asked (i) who decided in the current
trial (self or computer), (ii) who received the gain/loss in the cur-
rent trial (self or Anastasia), and (iii) which of the two gambles
had the better outcome (the selected one or the non-selected one).
Because subjects knew that such control trials would occur repeat-
edly throughout the experiment, they were forced to keep their
attention level high during the entire time. (In fact, analyses on
these control trials confirmed this, with only 1.1 mistakes made
per person on average.) Since these trials could not be analyzed due
to the absence of emotion ratings, there were finally 112 valid trials
(28 per experimental condition) for statistical analyses in each sub-
ject. Although gambles in these 112 valid trials were mostly played
exactly in the way as indicated on the screen (random and inde-
pendent outcomes) we manipulated the outcome of three trials
per condition to make sure that at least some negatively evaluated
outcomes expected to be primarily associated with guilt or regret
(which was our focus of interest) actually occurred. Specifically,
we made sure that the chosen gamble in these trials lost and the
non-chosen gamble won. (In turn, to compensate for this bias
toward losing, we made sure that the selected gamble always won
in the “catch trials” mentioned above).
After the gamble task, which took about 45 min, subjects filled
out the TG scale of the Guilt Inventory (Jones et al., 2000), consist-
ing of 20 items rated on 5-point response scales (exemplary items
are: “Guilt and remorse have been a part of my life for as long as
I can recall,” “I often feel ‘not right’ because of something I have
done,”and (with reverse scoring)“Guilt is not a particular problem
for me”). Before final debriefing, subjects received their monetary
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payoff, consisting of a show-up fee of 24 Euro (some of the subjects
were psychology students that chose to be reimbursed instead by
course credits) and an additional amount based on the outcome
of the experimental task. A task-dependent earning was also cal-
culated for Anastasia. As the total expected value across all gamble
outcomes was below zero, only few participants actually won any-
thing for themselves or for Anastasia. For ethical reasons, those
who lost were informed that they had kept their initial starting
capital of five Euros. The same applies to Anastasia. Hence, all par-
ticipants ended up with additional earnings of at least five Euros
for themselves as well as for Anastasia. Participants were informed
about their own and Anastasia’s earnings and signed both money
transfer forms, and the respective amounts of money were then
transferred to the subject and to the charitable organization“Berlin
hilft e.V.,” respectively.
RESULTS
COMPARISONS OF EMOTIONAL EXPERIENCES BETWEEN “SELF”
(INTRAPERSONAL) AND “OTHER” (INTERPERSONAL) CONDITIONS
Because the focus of interest was on the negative emotions guilt
and regret, the primary analysis comparing the “self” (intraper-
sonal) vs. “other” (interpersonal) conditions was performed on
the negatively evaluated trials (i.e., trials with overall outcome
evaluations below the midpoint of the overall negative-to-positive
outcome evaluation scale4). First, a 2× 2 ANOVA was performed
only on “choose” trials with “guilt vs. regret” and “self vs. other”
as within subjects factors, as an analysis directly correspond-
ing to previous psychological studies on intra- vs. interpersonal
situation descriptions (Berndsen et al., 2004; Zeelenberg and
Breugelmans, 2008). Figure 2 shows the results. Both main effects
were significant [“guilt vs. regret,” F(1,21)= 25.0, p< 0.001; “self
vs. other,” F(1,21)= 24.7, p< 0.001]. Most critically, these main
effects were qualified by a significant interaction between the
two factors [F(1,21)= 22.8, p< 0.001]. Subsequent pairwise t -
test comparisons between “self” and “other” separately for guilt
and regret revealed that, as expected, guilt was more strongly
experienced in the interpersonal “other” condition than in the
intrapersonal “self” condition [t (21)= 5.62, p< 0.001], while this
was not the case for regret [t (21)= 1.64, p= 0.12], although the
trend in the means was in the same direction as for guilt. Pair-
wise comparisons within conditions further showed that ratings
of regret were stronger than ratings of guilt in the “self” condi-
tion [t (21)= 6.61, p< 0.001], but not in the “other” condition
[t (21)= 1.43, p= 0.17]. The same analysis performed on “follow”
control trials (in which guilt and regret ratings were generally
very low, as expected; see Table 1) did not reveal any significant
effects, confirming specificity of the pattern to conditions of sub-
jectively experienced responsibility. Also, when the factor “choose
4On average, each experimental condition was represented by 14.2 trials, without
differences in the amount of trials between conditions (p > 0.20). The broad major-
ity of these trials (88%) was associated with both an absolute financial loss (i.e., the
chosen lottery lost) and a relative financial loss (i.e., the non-chosen lottery won,
or it lost less than the chosen lottery). On average, the absolute monetary loss was
2.17 ± 0.05 Euro and the relative monetary loss was 2.15 ± 0.15 Euro in these trials,
without any significant differences between experimental conditions (p > 0.25 for all
main effects and interactions). Thus, differences in experienced emotions between
conditions cannot be explained simply by differences in objective outcomes.
FIGURE 2 | Ratings of guilt and regret (means±SEM) after negatively
valenced outcomes when subjects had chosen a lottery for
themselves (“self” condition= intrapersonal/non-social) or for
Anastasia (“other” condition= interpersonal/social). Guilt but not regret
predominantly occurs in the interpersonal context.
Table 1 | Subjective ratings.
Choose Follow
Self Other Self Other
Guilt 2.01 (0.50) 4.54 (0.53) 0.42 (0.26) 0.65 (0.29)
Regret 4.63 (0.43) 5.07 (0.49) 1.88 (0.56) 1.69 (0.56)
Anger/irritation 5.74 (0.37) 6.32 (0.41) 5.05 (0.37) 5.61 (0.45)
Disappointment 5.83 (0.37) 6.67 (0.40) 5.47 (0.45) 5.68 (0.42)
Responsibility 5.07 (0.53) 5.54 (0.56) 0.19 (0.11) 0.19 (0.10)
Values indicate means and SEMs (in brackets) for negatively evaluated outcomes
on rating scales ranging from 0 to 10.
vs. follow” was directly included as an additional factor in the
ANOVA, all respective interactions with this factor were likewise
highly significant (p< 0.005).
When TG was introduced as an additional between-subjects
factor in this ANOVA (two groups of n= 11 each, formed
by median split), this factor did not moderate the critical
guilt/regret× self/other interaction [F(1,20)= 0.66, p= 0.43, for
three-way interaction with TG]. However, TG interacted with
the factor “guilt vs. regret” alone, indicating generally enhanced
ratings of guilt, but not regret, in high as compared to low
TG scorers [F(1,20)= 4.22, p= 0.05]. Separate analyses per-
formed in high and low TG subjects confirmed a signifi-
cant guilt/regret× self/other interaction in both groups [strongly
enhanced ratings of guilt, but not regret, in the interper-
sonal as compared to the intrapersonal condition; high TG:
F(1,10)= 10.02, p= 0.01, guilt-other 5.18± 0.77 vs. guilt-self
2.78± 0.78; regret-other 4.93± 0.70 vs. regret-self 4.98± 0.64;
low TG: F(1,10)= 16.43, p= 0.002, guilt-other 3.90± 0.72 vs.
guilt-self 1.23± 0.56; regret-other 5.21± 0.71 vs. regret-self
4.28± 0.59].
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For explorative purposes, we also looked for sex differences,
using gender instead of TG as a between-subjects factor. In fact,
there was a significant three-way interaction with gender, indi-
cating that the critical guilt/regret× self/other interaction was
stronger in women than in men [F(1,20)= 7.44, p< 0.05]. How-
ever, because the overall pattern was the same in men as in women
and was still significant when calculated separately in men alone
[F(1,11)= 7.43, p= 0.02], we do not consider sexes separately in
the interpretation of results.
For the sake of completeness, Table 1 shows means and SEMs
also for the other negative emotions anger/irritation and disap-
pointment, as well as responsibility ratings, in all experimental
conditions (data not separately shown for the low vs. high TG
scorers because of the lack of effects of this factor; all ps> 0.12).
These data show that guilt and regret, unlike disappointment,
and anger/irritation, were generally closely linked to the “choose”
condition, where participants felt – in contrast to the “follow”
condition – personally responsible for the outcome.
Because the difference between “other” and “self” was of pri-
mary interest here as an indicator of specificity to a social context,
we directly calculated in a complementing analysis this difference
as a separate dependent variable and compared guilt not only with
regret, but also – as an additional control for specificity – for the
other negative emotions disappointment and anger/irritation (as
well as the control variable of perceived responsibility), and per-
formed the same comparisons not only in the critical “choose”
conditions, but also in the no-responsibility control condition
of “follow” trials (Figure 3). The figure shows that although all
emotions were overall somewhat higher in the “other” than in
the “self” condition when subjects had actively chosen the gam-
ble to be played, only guilt showed a distinct specificity in this
regard. This was confirmed in a 5 (emotion)× 2 (choose/follow)
within subjects ANOVA by an emotion× choose/follow interac-
tion [F(4,84)= 11.38, p< 0.001] qualifying a choose/follow main
effect [F(1,21)= 21.23, p< 0.001]. In fact, guilt in the “choose”
condition differed strongly from all other emotion ratings in this
respect (all pairwise comparisons p< 0.001). Regarding “follow”
control trials (gray columns in Figure 3), there was no consistent
pattern, and for none of the emotions did the other-self difference
differ significantly from zero.
Despite the differential extent of guilt and regret experiences
depending on interpersonal vs. intrapersonal choices, correla-
tion analyses still showed a close relation between responsibil-
ity, guilt, and regret even within the “choose” conditions, where
responsibility ratings were generally on a high level. In the crit-
ical “Other-Choose” condition, the only condition where ratings
indicated the experience of both guilt and regret to a substan-
tial degree, both guilt and regret were highly correlated with
subjectively perceived responsibility and also correlated with
each other (correlation guilt-responsibility, r = 0.68; correlation
regret-responsibility, r = 0.70; correlation guilt-regret, r = 0.74; all
p< 0.001). Even in the “Self-Choose” condition, despite the gen-
erally low level of guilt, responsibility correlated with both regret
and guilt (correlation regret-responsibility, r = 0.77, p< 0.001;
correlation guilt-responsibility, r = 0.44, p< 0.05), and guilt and
regret ratings also showed a strong direct correlation (r = 0.64,
p< 0.001). (The correlations between guilt and regret even
FIGURE 3 | Rating differences (means±SEM) between “Other” and
“Self” conditions (as an indicator of specificity to a social context) for
guilt, regret, anger/irritation, disappointment, and responsibility after
negatively evaluated trial outcomes. In the active “choose” conditions
(black bars), guilt showed distinct social specificity, differing from all other
emotions (all p<0.001). In passive “follow” conditions (gray bars), no social
specificity was observed for any of the ratings.
survived when disappointment and anger/irritation were partialed
out (p< 0.05), but lost significance when responsibility was addi-
tionally partialed out.) When TG was correlated with guilt and
regret ratings in the Other-Choose condition, the correlation with
guilt but not with regret was significant (guilt, r = 0.47, p< 0.05;
regret r = 0.17, p= 0.46). In the Self-Choose condition, TG like-
wise correlated with guilt (r = 0.49, p< 0.05) but also with regret
(r = 0.42, p= 0.05).
TRAIT GUILT AND LOSS AVERSION
To test the hypothesis that higher TG is associated with stronger
loss aversion, we first compared low and high TG scorers with
respect to the overall number of trials in the “choose” condition
in which they preferred the option with lower possible loss over
the option with higher possible loss, using a t -test for indepen-
dent samples. This analysis revealed a significant difference, with
a higher percentage of loss averse choices for high as compared
to low TG subjects (23.2± 2.8% vs. 15.3± 2.1%, t (20)= 2.25,
p< 0.05).
To test the additional possibility of a more dynamic and more
specific influence of TG on choice behavior, we first computed
four different variables for each subject: (1) the percentage of nega-
tively evaluated other-choose trials followed by a loss averse choice
in the next other-choose trial (“Other–Other” condition), (2) the
percentage of negatively evaluated other-choose trials followed
by a loss averse choice in the next self-choose trial (“Other-Self”
condition), (3) the percentage of negatively evaluated self-choose
trials followed by a loss averse choice in the next self-choose trial
(“Self–Self” condition), and (4) the percentage of negatively eval-
uated self-choose trials followed by a loss averse choice in the next
other-choose trial (“Self-Other” condition). The first two of these
variables represent the conditions of choices after experiencing
(interpersonal) guilt, while the latter two variables represent the
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conditions of choices after experiencing (intrapersonal) regret.
Any specific effects of these emotions would be reflected in selec-
tively enhanced values in congruent choice conditions correspond-
ing to these emotions, i.e., the“Other–Other”condition for specific
effects of guilt and the “Self–Self” condition for specific effects of
intrapersonal regret. Furthermore, no such effects should occur
when a previous choice was not negatively but positively evaluated
due to the absence of guilt or regret feelings. For control purposes,
we therefore calculated the same four variables also for the choices
after positively evaluated outcomes. Thus, the percentage of loss
averse choices in these different conditions was subjected to an
ANOVA, with the three within subjects factors “self vs. other” in
current trials, “self vs. other” in the next “choose” trial, and “neg-
ative” vs. “positive” emotional evaluation of the current outcome,
and the additional between-subjects factor low vs. high TG.
This ANOVA showed that, apart from a main effect of
high vs. low TG [F(1,20)= 5.05, p< 0.05, confirming the above
mentioned overall t -test comparison between the two groups],
emotion-specific effects indeed occurred depending on TG.
Specifically, a main effect of “self vs. other” in the next choice
was qualified not only by an interaction with valence (“nega-
tive” vs. “positive”) but also with “self vs. other” in the current
choice in combination with TG [all F(1,20)> 4.5, p< 0.05]. To
break down these differential effects depending on TG, we ana-
lyzed the emotion-specific patterns separately in the groups of
high vs. low TG subjects. Within the high TG group, only the main
effect of “self vs. other” in the next choice was statistically sig-
nificant, indicating overall higher loss aversion in “Self” than in
“Other” conditions [F(1,10)= 6.65, p< 0.05]. In contrast, within
the low TG group a more complex, emotion-specific pattern was
observed, in which a main effect of valence was qualified by an
interaction with “self vs. other” in the next choice, and by an
interaction with “self vs. other” in the next choice in combina-
tion with “self vs. other” in the current choice [all F(1,10)> 8.3,
p< 0.05]. Inspection of the mean values in the different con-
ditions (Table 2) shows that this interaction reflects an effect
specifically related to the condition of guilt experience (negative
Other condition) in this group of subjects. In fact, subjects in
this group, just as those in the high TG group, likewise showed
an overall tendency toward higher loss aversion in decisions for
oneself in all conditions, while only after experiencing guilt this
pattern was reversed (i.e., higher loss aversion in decisions for
Anastasia). Directly correlating TG with loss averse choice behav-
ior confirmed the ANOVA results. TG was positively correlated
[r = 0.37] with loss aversion overall (reflecting the main effect),
but negatively correlated specifically with the difference between
loss averse interpersonal choices after guilt experience (i.e., nega-
tive Other–Other condition) and respective control conditions on
which the complex interactive effect is based (difference to neg-
ative Other–Self, r =−0.65; difference to positive Other–Other,
r =−0.41; each p< 0.05).
A control analysis using risk-avoiding choice behavior as the
dependent variable (choosing the lottery with the lower difference
between the possible gain and the possible loss) did not reveal
any statistical significance (all ANOVA effects p> 0.12), showing
specificity of the observed effects to the simpler choice strategy of
loss aversion, in which possible gains are not considered.
Table 2 | Percentages of loss averse choices.
Current choice Self Other













































Values indicate means and SEMs (in brackets) for percentages of subjects’ loss
averse next choices when they evaluate the outcome of their choice in the current
trial as emotionally negative vs. emotionally positive, depicted separately for the
four possible combinations of choice conditions (“Self” followed by “Self”/“Self”
followed by “Other”/“Other” followed by “Self”/“Other” followed by “Other”)
and for participants scoring high vs. low on Trait Guilt (n=11 per group). Current
“Self” choice with negative emotional evaluation is associated with (intraper-
sonal) regret, current “Other” choice with negative emotional evaluation is asso-
ciated with (interpersonal) guilt. High Trait Guilt scorers are generally more loss
averse, but unlike low scorers do not change their choice behavior in response
to specific emotional experiences in the current choice trial. Values with identical
superscript differ significantly from each other in pairwise comparisons between
experimental conditions at p< 0.05.
Although women and men did not differ significantly in TG in
our sample [women 54.16± 3.37, men 50.56± 3.61, t (20)= 0.72,
p= 0.48], we also performed a control analysis on loss averse
choices using gender instead of TG as between-subjects factor.
None of the effects including gender reached significance (all
p> 0.31), excluding the possibility that the differential effects
observed for low vs. high TG subjects would simply reflect gender
differences.
DISCUSSION
Extending a well-established experimental procedure of intraper-
sonal regret (Camille et al., 2004; Coricelli et al., 2005) by adding an
interpersonal (social) dimension, we present here an experimental
procedure which allows a differential induction of feelings of guilt
and regret. Specifically, in accordance with previous psychologi-
cal findings based on descriptions of scenarios or personal past
events, guilt was induced to a stronger degree when subjects felt
responsible for interpersonal harm than when they felt respon-
sible for intrapersonal harm. This was not the case for regret,
nor for disappointment, or anger/irritation, although the means
in all these emotions tended into the same direction as for guilt.
Not only the clear pattern of results that confirmed the primary
hypothesis on the differences between guilt and regret is remark-
able, but also the absolute intensity of these feelings elicited in
this very simple choice paradigm (means of about five on a scale
ranging from 0 to 10 in the conditions of interest). As to regret,
we had not formulated a specific hypothesis, because previous
results were inconsistent with regard to the intrapersonal vs. inter-
personal nature of regret (Berndsen et al., 2004; Zeelenberg and
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Breugelmans, 2008). In the present study, we found no substantial
difference between regret ratings between intrapersonal and inter-
personal choice conditions, consistent with the findings from
Zeelenberg and Breugelmans (2008).
Despite the clearly different pattern of means for guilt and
regret between conditions, our results obtained from correlation
analyses also confirm the specific commonalities of these two emo-
tions. In contrast to other negative emotions, guilt and regret were
closely associated with subjectively experienced responsibility.
Even within “choose” conditions (associated with high responsi-
bility) both guilt and regret correlated substantially with subjective
responsibility, and they were also highly correlated with each other.
Particularly in interpersonal choice conditions, where both guilt
and regret ratings had similarly high absolute values, this raises the
interesting question of what conceptually distinguishes guilt from
interpersonal regret. Obviously, while there can be regret without
substantial guilt (as shown in the intrapersonal condition), it may
be impossible to experience guilt without regret in interpersonal
conditions, and the high correlation between the two emotions
suggests that they do not only co-occur in these contexts, but
indeed strongly overlap conceptually. In other words, guilt and
interpersonal regret may describe essentially the same core emo-
tion. Alternatively, there may still be differences in the sense that,
contrary to interpersonal regret, guilt is not only linked to a social
context but also to moral evaluations in a certain situation. A
closely related question would be whether regret experienced in
an intrapersonal context is qualitatively the same as regret experi-
enced in an interpersonal context. If not, it would be useful to use
different names for them, or to always add the respective adjec-
tive describing the particular context. The present study was not
designed to answer these questions, which should be investigated
more directly in future studies. In the following, we will refer to
regret only as intrapersonal regret, not only because this is the tra-
ditional use of the term in regret research (Mellers et al., 1999;
Camille et al., 2004; Coricelli et al., 2005), but also due to its
obvious close link to guilt in the interpersonal domain.
It is noteworthy that subjects indicated strongly enhanced feel-
ings of responsibility (and as a consequence also of regret and
guilt) after own lottery choices, compared to those made by the
computer, even though the final outcome was still a matter of
chance. (Subjects did not have to choose the outcome directly, but
only the lottery to be played.) This underlines the role of subjec-
tive responsibility, as opposed to objective responsibility, as critical
factor underlying feelings of guilt and regret. Although objective
and subjective responsibility would normally coincide, the latter
appears to be the primary determinant if they do not. For exam-
ple, people typically feel more regret when a negative outcome
is a result of their action rather than of their inaction (Kahne-
man and Tversky, 1982), which can be explained by reduced sense
of responsibility for inaction. Conversely, subjectively perceived
responsibility may be experienced in certain cases of “survivor
guilt” in people who are the only survivor of a traffic accident, even
though they were not involved in any way in the circumstances
leading to the accident. Thus, although our simplified paradigm
does not simulate a prototype of an everyday situation of guilt
and regret, it still captures subjective responsibility as a central
factor.
A specific advantage of the present paradigm, consisting of
a series of personal choices, is that it not only allows the dif-
ferential induction of guilt and regret, but also examining how
avoiding these emotions can affect choice behavior. Because such
effects are likely to be influenced by personality differences per-
tinent to these emotions (De Hooge et al., 2007; Gangemi et al.,
2007; Nelissen et al., 2007), we focused here on guilt, for which, in
contrast to regret, established procedures to assess stable individ-
ual differences exist (see Robins et al., 2007, for an overview). In
the present paradigm, subjects had few opportunities to employ
complex choice strategies in order to avoid guilt or regret, and
there was no objectively better choice option because in each trial
both lotteries had comparable expected values. Given these con-
straints of the task, we assumed that subjects motivated to avoid
guilt or regret would apply the simple strategy of loss aversion by
choosing the lottery in which less money was lost in the case of a
loss. We found two interesting results in this regard. First, subjects
high in TG were generally more loss averse than those low in TG.
Second, however, only subjects low in Trait displayed enhanced
loss aversion in the next emotion-congruent trial (next interper-
sonal choice) after an antecedent experience of guilt. Although
seemingly contradictory at first glance, this pattern makes sense.
Subjects high in TG are probably most strongly motivated to avoid
guilt. As confirmed by our data, these subjects did indeed exhibit
overall higher guilt ratings after choices with negative outcomes.
Because this was likewise the case for interpersonal as well as for
intrapersonal choices, it makes sense that these subjects generalize
their motivation to avoid guilt to all decisions. From this perspec-
tive, loss aversion per se in risky choices may represent a stable
trait-like factor, which is linked to high TG. In contrast, low TG
scorers, who do not feel guilt as frequently, may be able to use their
guilt and regret feelings more readily as helpful information that
they can use to adapt future behavior specifically under similar
circumstances.
Thus, our results confirm previous studies also pointing to
personality-dependent effects of guilt-associated behavior. In a
study from Ketelaar and Au, 2003, Study 1, effects of experimen-
tally induced guilt led to increased cooperation in a repeated
prisoner’s dilemma game only in subjects who initially played
uncooperatively (a behavior likely to be associated with low TG),
while participants who played highly cooperatively from the begin-
ning, showed no effect of guilt induction. Such effects may be
explained by a ceiling effect, but this explanation would not be
convincing because subjects were clearly below ceiling at least in
some of the conditions, and even more so in the present study,
where the overall percentage of loss averse choices was on average
below 25% even in high TG subjects5. The findings by Ketelaar and
Au (2003) were further supported by subsequent studies demon-
strating that only proself-oriented, but not prosocial subjects were
particularly sensitive to effects of guilt induction procedures on
subsequent cooperation in a one-shot social dilemma game (De
Hooge et al., 2007; Nelissen et al., 2007).
5The generally low level of loss-averse choices may be explained by the fact that
subjects knew that overall not more than the initial capital could be lost. Hence
there was no overall risk to really lose money in the experiment, which may bias
subjects toward optimistic choices.
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Consistent with these previous results, and in line with the
original interpretation from Ketelaar and Au (2003), we would
therefore take our findings as a support for a functional view of the
“affect-as-information” model (Schwarz and Clore, 1983), where
using the own affective state (in this case: feelings of guilt) as an
information for future behavior is most effective in individuals
who are not too strongly accustomed to experiencing these emo-
tions. If experiencing certain emotions becomes a habit or trait
(as in the case of guilt in high TG scorers), these emotions may
become less informative, and a more general pattern of choice
behavior (a general loss aversion here) may emerge. This more
general effect, found to be related to high TG in our study, is in
line with a previous study by Gangemi et al. (2007) who showed
that individuals high in TG more than those low in TG use their
guilt feelings as information about possible threats when antici-
pating types of negative events in which oneself feels responsible
and which would potentially lead to damage not only to others,
but also to oneself.
Our analysis focused on loss aversion, because we assumed that
subjects’differential motivation to avoid guilt or regret would most
likely be reflected in this behavioral strategy as the easiest possible
strategy that subjects could apply within the constraints of our
experimental paradigm. Consistent with this assumption, we did
not observe differences between experimental conditions when
we performed the same analysis on risk-focused rather than sim-
ply loss-focused behavior, i.e., a strategy that compares the two
lotteries not only with regard to possible losses but with regard
to the difference between gains and losses within each lottery.
Such risk-focused behavior is more cognitively demanding in our
task because it requires taking four rather than only two numbers
into account as a basis for the decision. However, these results
do not imply that loss averse choice behavior would generally
be the preferred strategy that people apply. Depending on spe-
cific circumstances of a task (e.g., number of trials, time limits
for decisions) risk-focused strategies can likewise be used. We
would expect this particularly if such a strategy is less cognitively
demanding than in our task. This is in fact the case in the more
prototypical studies related to risk aversion vs. risk seeking, where
subjects choose between a gamble and a safe option, so that the
risk differences between the two alternatives are obvious. Actually,
behavioral effects of anticipated regret and guilt have previously
been shown in such tasks (e.g., Zeelenberg et al., 1996; Mancini and
Gangemi, 2003). The influence of task-dependent cognitive load is
certainly a relevant aspect that would deserve closer examination
in future studies.
In sum, the results on the effects of emotional experiences on
choice strategies in our paradigm overall demonstrate basically
two ways in which guilt and regret could exert self-regulating
effects via an influence on loss averse choice behavior. One is a
general one linked to high TG, i.e., an individual tendency to expe-
rience guilt (but most likely also to some degree to the tendency to
experience regret, because the TG scale does not unambiguously
differentiate between the two emotions), which leads to generally
enhanced loss aversion in decisions. This way, these individuals can
generally minimize the occurrence of both guilt and regret. The
second way is a situation-specific effect where interpersonal guilt
and intrapersonal regret experiences lead to behavioral changes
only in subsequent congruent experimental conditions, i.e., when
interpersonal guilt and intrapersonal regret can be avoided, respec-
tively. However, this second effect is not independent of the first
one, because it is only found in individuals with low TG in relation
to guilt avoidance. It can therefore be regarded as an alternative
strategy for those subjects who do not adopt the general strategy,
as the high TG scorers do.
Both strategies can be interpreted within the framework of
“indirect causation theory” (Baumeister et al., 2007), which pro-
poses that consciously experiencing emotions enables people to
learn from their experiences. Specific evidence for this view with
regard to guilt comes from self-reports of people who typically
indicate that they have learned something from personal events
in which they had experienced guilt feelings (Baumeister et al.,
2007; Stillman and Baumeister, 2010). Our data suggest that one
behavioral indicator of this learning process is expressed in loss
aversion (consistent with an attempt to avoid feelings of guilt and
regret), but what exactly has been learned in this regard appears to
differ between individuals high vs. low in TG as a result of differ-
ent learning histories associated with guilt experiences. Whereas
the former group, being prone to guilt in all choice situations
(as confirmed by our subjective rating data), apparently learned a
general lesson to avoid guilt (but also all other associated negative
emotions, including regret) in decision situations, the latter group
seems to have learned more specifically to behave in a way that
avoids the repetition of a specific guilt experience having occurred
shortly before (cf. “feeling-is-for-doing” approach by Zeelenberg
et al., 2008). Put differently, the first group may have adapted their
behavior more generally on the basis of their overall enhanced
guilt experiences, regardless of their occurrence in a specific situ-
ational context, while the other group rather learned to use these
emotions to change behavior acutely within a situational context.
Regarding differences between guilt and regret, at least the sec-
ond strategy appears to be clearly emotion-specific, being confined
to conditions of interpersonal choice, and hence experiences of
guilt. However, two possible caveats are to be considered here. First,
our data show a generally higher loss aversion in“self”choices than
in “other” choices. This might indicate that subjects’ motivation to
avoid intrapersonal regret was overall higher than the motivation
to avoid guilt, and could therefore less easily be further enhanced
by additional motivational effects of personality factors. Second,
and more importantly, we focused our analysis here on TG as a
moderating personality factor. It is likely that analogous results
could be found for regret avoiding decisions in relation to per-
sonality factors specifically related to regret proneness. It would
be useful to include such a personality factor in future studies in
order to strengthen the interpretation of emotion specificity of
behavioral effects of guilt vs. regret. Most desirable for this pur-
pose would be the development of an instrument that specifically
aims at distinguishing guilt- and regret-related trait factors. To
our knowledge, such an instrument is still missing, while much
work has been devoted to create differential measures for guilt and
shame proneness (Tangney, 1990; Kugler and Jones, 1992; Robins
et al., 2007; Rüsch et al., 2007; Tangney et al., 2007).
In conclusion, we developed a new experimental decision-
making paradigm that allows a differential induction of guilt and
regret online (despite the close relatedness of these two emotions),
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as well as an analysis of their effects on regulation of subsequent
choice behavior. The results show that TG is a critical factor that
moderates the role of guilt vs. regret avoidance as critical regula-
tors of choice behavior by way of loss averse strategies. Although
definite conclusions regarding the differential self-regulating func-
tions of guilt vs. regret would be premature at this stage, the data
suggest that feelings of guilt are mostly informative in acute, short-
term decisions for those people who do not experience them often.
However, if experienced more regularly and intensely, guilt may
exert behavioral and emotion regulating effects that go beyond
the short-term anticipation of its occurrence, resulting in a more
generalized strategy to avoid guilt with its associated negative emo-
tions (including regret). If confirmed, it would be interesting to
investigate how such processes can contribute to certain clini-
cal conditions, such as obsessive compulsive disorder, borderline
personality disorder, and major depression, which are associated
with enhanced guilt propensity (Mancini and Gangemi, 2004;
Rüsch et al., 2007; Kim et al., 2011). It is conceivable that in cer-
tain extreme cases, where guilt is increasingly experienced even
without any reasonable justification, such generalized effects of
guilt on choice behavior and decision-making may become more
and more maladaptive and could in this way eventually lead to
“pathological guilt” as observed in such disorders (Shapiro and
Stewart, 2011). Because our results point to a critical role of sta-
ble individual differences, it would be useful to develop differential
trait questionnaires techniques that can better distinguish between
the inclinations to experience guilt vs. regret than it is possible at
present. Such an improved distinction would be relevant not only
theoretically, but may ultimately also be useful to understand how
exactly guilt- vs. regret-related regulation mechanisms contribute
to the etiology of psychiatric disorders in which these emotions
play a critical role.
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